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COMMERCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: WHO’S REGULATING WHOM?
By Stephen Tully*1
INTRODUCTION
ne corporate response to climate change is engaging
directly or indirectly with the intergovernmental
regime. Of the some six thousand registered
participants attending the tenth Conference of the Parties
(“COP”) of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) in Buenos Aires during 2004, over 560
individuals represented industry including 123 delegates accredited to the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). This
article considers the manner and extent to which corporations
initiate or prevent regulatory change at the international level
through the procedural lens of their participatory entitlements at
a COP. Part One reviews the applicable procedural rules governing access, attendance, and terms of corporate participation.
It also traces how the modalities for corporate participation have
evolved since 1992 in tandem with mutating corporate strategies. Part Two assesses the degree of regulatory change initiated by corporations in substantive and procedural terms and
characterizes the nature of their contribution against different
regulatory models. Part Three identifies several reasons
supporting the conclusion that engagement with intergovernmental negotiations as a strategic business opportunity can
prove to be impeded and ultimately unconstructive in the
context of climate change.

O

PART ONE: THE COMMERCIAL STRATEGY OF
PARTICIPATING IN REGULATORY DESIGN
Corporate responses to environmental regulation oscillate
between reactive and obstructionist strategies to proactive and
constructive approaches.2 This observation is also true in the
context of climate change.3 Companies seize commercial
opportunities, manage risk, minimize transaction costs, develop
environmentally-friendly products, compete against rivals, and
anticipate (or seek to influence) likely market developments.4
More specifically, management responses to rules that are
ambiguous, contradictory, and subject to rapid change range
between competition, avoidance, accommodation, collaboration, and compromise.5 The degree of corporate assertiveness
depends on what is at stake (assessable against individual corporate strategy, financial condition, or perception of urgency)
and relative leverage power (enhanced by forming coalitions
with like-minded protagonists, becoming indispensable, or
threatening withdrawal).
Non-market strategies at the national level include participating in regulatory design. Corporate officers are urged to
encourage the emergence of regulatory climates that are stable,
predictable, and conducive to investment.6 Political entrepreSPRING 2005

neurialism includes serving on government panels, providing
information, targeting receptive audiences, and molding commercial objectives around pre-existing political agendas. Access
to government officials enables agenda-setting and publicizing
an issue to increase the likelihood of inclusion in regulatory
development. Interestingly, large firms exploit their well-developed corporate image to build political capital for deployment
elsewhere, whereas more vulnerable firms pursue business
objectives from their new-found political legitimacy.7
In the cross-border context the strategic behavior of multinational corporations also includes regulatory engagement. This
is unsurprising since multilateral environmental agreements
are increasingly defining the scope of corporate liability.8
Furthermore, private sector participation in the climate change
context is expressly contemplated by each of the flexibility
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: international emissions trading between Annex 1 Parties (developed States) under
Article 17; investment in projects within Annex 1 Parties (joint
implementation) under Articles 3, 4, and 6; and investments by
Annex 1 Parties within non-Annex 1 Parties (developing States)
through the clean development mechanism (“CDMs”) of
Article 12.9 It has been observed that corporate political practices do not replicate those ordinarily utilized within the home
State but respond to the immediate political environment.10 The
manner and visibility of corporate political activity will therefore adapt to the particular institutional characteristics of intergovernmental fora. However, the proposition that corporations
initiate intergovernmental regulatory development presupposes
that they enjoy favorable terms of access and inclusion. A
review of the modalities for observer participation at COPs suggests only limited opportunities to formally contribute.

THE MODALITIES FOR CORPORATE PARTICIPATION
IN THE UNFCCC PROCESS
It is axiomatic that only heads of government, diplomats,
and other accredited representatives may express the formal
consent of States to be bound to conventional instruments.11
This does not preclude non-State actors from participating in
COPs as observers. Observers are “willing to provide meaningful contributions to the climate change process and to enhance
the engagement by civil society in the pursuit of sustainable
development.”12 The formal arrangements for observer participation involve a prior accreditation process and the modalities
for participating at the COP itself.
* Stephen Tully, formerly B.P. Postdoctoral Fellow of the ESRC Centre for the
Analysis of Risk and Regulation and of the Law Department, London School of
Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, specializes in issues relating
to corporations under public international law.
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The Accreditation Process
Article 7(6) of the UNFCCC contemplates national or international non-governmental bodies or agencies “qualified in matters covered by the Convention” being represented at COPs as
observers unless one-third of States Parties object.13 Observers
must be relevantly competent or broadly representative of a
group interested in the topic of climate change. UNFCCC
accreditation is a continuous process with 834 non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
admitted as observers to date.14
Those already in consultative
status with the United Nations
(“U.N.”) are automatically
accredited without further
screening.
Although
the
UNFCCC secretariat initially
evaluates applications, admission is without prejudice to
subsequent COP decisions.
Applicants provide official
documentation describing the
scope of their mandate, governing structure, evidence of nonprofit (tax exempt) status,
activities demonstrating their
competence, affiliation details,
funding sources, publications, and designated contact points.
The non-profit criterion is partly irrelevant since a legitimate purpose of politically-organized business is to defend and
advance the interests of enterprises they represent. For example,
the International Climate Change Partnership represents chemical companies, the American Petroleum Institute represents U.S.
oil companies, and the World Energy Council represents energy
and utility interests. Although participating through politicallyorganized business groups usefully distances corporations from
political negotiations, it also poses several disadvantages (considered further below). Nonetheless, the Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (“SBI”) concluded that “the current arrangements for the accreditation of NGOs were satisfactory, and that
no change in the accreditation procedures was required.”15

missions. Rule 7(2) of the procedural rules provides that
“observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate
without the right to vote in the proceedings of any session in
matters of direct concern to the body or agency they represent,
unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session
object.” Observers do not enjoy voting rights nor have they
called for them, particularly if this entails responsibility to
implement decisions taken.
For the orderly conduct of
proceedings, the prior permission of the COP President is
required under Rule 32 before
individuals may speak. Although
priority for oral interventions is
accorded to States there is no
obligation to balance statements
from other speakers. Observers
address the COP for three minutes at the conclusion of the
final plenary session. The ICC
typically appoints a representative from the local chamber of
commerce to act as spokesperson. Although this opportunity
is jealously safeguarded by
observers, such interventions are
neither useful nor effective since decisions have already been
made and there is no opportunity for meaningful dialogue. Only
as recently as COP 9 were observers permitted to make
interventions on substantive agenda items during the plenary
session.
Under Rule 30 COP meetings are ordinarily public, and
although meetings of the two UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice,
“SBSTA,” and the SBI) are designated as private, this does not
preclude participation by duly accredited observers. However,
attendance can be unproductive and uninformative given
diplomatic posturing and limited time. Meetings closed to
observers include press briefings given by national delegations
and more importantly meetings of intergovernmental groups
other than convention bodies. UNFCCC expert group meetings
are ordinarily closed to observers and although there has not
been any demand for informal contact between them, expert
groups may draw upon additional expertise on an ad hoc basis
as deemed necessary.
Observers may also produce written statements in the
nature of reports and position or issue papers in U.N. languages
at their own expense. Although their content is not screened,
documents may only be displayed at designated locations, cannot promote products or services, and samples must be deposited with the secretariat. Under Rule 36 formal proposals are
introduced in writing by State Parties and distributed to delegations through the secretariat. Observer submissions when
solicited by governments are reproduced through the internet
and do not constitute official U.N. documents. By this route

Infusing commercial
perspectives can facilitate
or impede orderly regime
development by
extenuating the common
or disparate economic
interests of States.

Formal Modalities for Observer Participation
Observer participation at a COP is circumscribed by a primary enabling provision located within the UNFCCC text, secondary rules of procedure, and relevant governing body decisions. Article 7(2)(l) of the UNFCCC provides that COPs shall
“seek and utili[z]e, where appropriate, the services and co-operation of, and information provided by, competent…non-governmental bodies.” Observer participation is more specifically proscribed by procedural rules. The UNFCCC envisages that the
COP will adopt these rules at its first session.16 However, COP
1 was unable to do so and provisional rules have since been
applied.17
The procedural rules contemplate two modalities for formal
participation by observers: oral interventions and written sub15
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observers can propose textual suggestions on individual agenda
items or draft decisions.18
Although receiving objective information is a costless
means for governments to increase their knowledge base provided the volume is manageable, it is also a significant lobbying
technique. Just as there is no right or expectation for observers
to produce written submissions, so too is there no attendant obligation upon governments to consider their content. Influence
thus depends upon a credible reputation for producing balanced
proposals possessing intrinsic merit above author self-interest.
Observers undermine their stature by presenting unreliable data,
making exaggerated claims, or misjudging public opinion.
Observer practices are also regularized by governing body
decisions. The COP decided that observers may also attend
open-ended (that is, open to all States) contact group meetings
unless one third of State Parties present object.19 This is with
the understanding that proceedings can be closed at any time.
Such a decision marks a departure from orthodox U.N. practice
insofar as informal meetings are ordinarily closed to accredited
observers. The COP also decided that observers enjoy a right of
access to all official documentation unless the relevant body
determines otherwise.20 This is consistent with the SBI instructing “the secretariat to proceed with…activities, within the available resources…[for]… improving the availability of documentation and information to NGOs.”21

Managing Observer Participation in Practice
Finally, the modalities for observer participation at a COP
evolve by accretion based upon experimentation and prior experience. This includes the practice of States, the UNFCCC secretariat, and observers.
State Parties under Rule 17 are represented by heads of delegation “and such other accredited representatives, alternate
representatives and advisers as it may require.” Observers may
be appointed to national delegations to act in a general advisory
capacity or to negotiate specific points. States enjoy the widest
possible freedom of appointment, particularly where specialized
technical matters require enlisting experts possessing the necessary training and experience.22 European practice permits corporate officers to act as experts or consultants and exceptionally as head of delegation.23 Comparable U.S. guidelines envisage
that private sector representatives may not speak on behalf of
the government but may explain factual details where competent to do so for promoting national objectives.24 Industry assistance may be offered to governments to prepare oral interventions delivered during plenary sessions or intergovernmental
debates. For example, the Global Climate Coalition (“GCC”)
advised the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Russian governments,
purportedly to obstruct political deliberations and weaken the
language of scientific reports.25
The UNFCCC secretariat has formulated guidelines concerning observer participation at COPs “reflecting current practice” and “in line with those governing NGO participation at
sessions of other bodies in the UN system.”26 Contemporary
practices include briefing observers, conducting information
sessions outlining substantive negotiation issues, allocating
SPRING 2005

office space, and arranging meetings with senior delegates.27 To
facilitate COP proceedings the secretariat also commissions
work or expertise, exchanges information, and identifies suitable observer representatives to participate in panel discussions.
Secretariat practices are fluid and incremental: once privileges
are secured by observers they must be safeguarded since they
can be withdrawn without, notice particularly if abused.
The UNFCCC secretariat employs a constituency system
that differentiates between research and independent NGOs
(“RINGOs”), business and industry NGOs (“BINGOs”), environmental NGOs (“ENGOs”), local NGOs, indigenous peoples
organizations (“IPOs”), local government and municipal authorities (“LGMAs”), islanders, trade unions, and faith-based
groups. Participation in constituency groups is not official or
binding and does not preclude direct secretariat communication.
Designated focal points (for example, the ICC for BINGOs) act
as conduits to ensure effective observer participation by providing logistical support, identifying attendance demand, and
recruiting qualified individuals. Although the constituency
channel usefully structures observer participation, it inaccurately pools distinctive groups, can ignore differences of opinion,
and obfuscates overlapping membership.
The terms of observer participation, as formally defined by
the procedural rules with the accretions of State and secretariat
practices, provide an important platform legitimating attendance
and activity at COPs. However, several informal techniques do
not depend upon these foundations for their effectiveness.
Observer techniques also include lobbying, submitting proposals, organizing side-events, and raising issues for resolution.28
Additional modalities for observer participation include participating in workshops or panel discussions, conducting constituency meetings, and information gathering or dissemination.
For example, roundtables are an informal means for identifying the capacities, mandate, expectations, experiences, and
constraints of others. Although participation occurs on conditions approximating equality, meaningful dialogue need not
eventuate, since interventions are limited by time and depend
upon the Chairperson’s discretion. Furthermore, senior corporate executives assess attendance against other business
demands notwithstanding their considerable economic credentials and readiness, or otherwise to make commitments. The
UNFCCC secretariat has thus been pressing governments
towards more innovative formats which produce open, frank,
and spontaneous discussion.
The current practice for attendance and participation at
inter-sessional workshops and limited-membership bodies is by
invitation only and may be closed to observers when confidential matters are discussed.29 Constituency groups employ their
own selection procedures to identify representatives and bear
their own expenses. The challenge for governments is to promote transparency and observer participation (balanced geographically and by mandate) while safeguarding operational
efficiency and effectiveness (as determined by purpose, interest,
and available resources). For example, the U.S. objected to one
observer allocation by the UNFCCC secretariat which “clearly
16

favored” representatives of companies that were members of the
ICC, “an umbrella organi[z]ation that is not fully representative
of our private sector.”30 SBI guidance instructs chairpersons to
tailor the number of observers to the nature of the workshop and
for the secretariat to improve the timeliness of distributing notifications and non-confidential documents, including through
web-based publications.31
To summarize, the formal conditions for observer admission to and participation at COPs critically depend upon State
consent.32 Observers only possess a legitimate expectation in
most respects and do not possess many rights that are opposable
against governments.33 That said, under Rule 8 duly-accredited
observers are entitled to receive notification of forthcoming
COPs and proposed agenda items.34 However, this does not
guarantee admission and negotiations strictly remain a matter
for States Parties. This is evidenced by the procedural rules,
governing or subsidiary body decisions, and the role of discretion exercised by individual Chairpersons. Contemporary practices concerning observer participation within the UNFCCC
process are a leading illustration of U.N.-civil society engagement and as such are subject to ongoing refinement. COPs
typically invite observers to play an active role in deliberations,
recognize the desirability of information exchange, and indicate
a willingness to consider submissions. How then do corporations seek to engage with intergovernmental negotiators on
climate change?

CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGEMENT
Corporate strategies for engaging with the UNFCCC spring
initially from intergovernmental negotiations for protecting the
ozone layer if not earlier. This is unsurprising given the presence
of repeat players such as the Alliance for a Responsible
Atmospheric Policy.35 A brief overview of the historiography of
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol ostensibly
demonstrates “the crucial role played by industry in developing
and implementing international environmental policy.”36

Corporate Coalitions
(and Fragmenting Industry Opinion)
Similarly observed in the context of climate change, producers initially sought to refute existing scientific opinion
through extensive lobbying and media campaigns. This tactic
was abandoned following intergovernmental scientific assessments which concluded that human activity contributed to
ozone layer depletion.37 Indeed, one U.K. firm had been officially reprimanded for employing discredited language.38 The
European chemical industry’s attempts to block international
regulation were abandoned with the adoption of the Montreal
Protocol.39 European governments also initially had espoused
industry opinion concerning scientific uncertainty, non-viable
product substitution, and lower living standards,40 an interesting
contrast to their leadership aspirations in the climate change
context.
In a similar fashion the GCC financed advertising campaigns, commissioned reports and recruited scientists, think
tanks, and public relations firms. In its view, measures to curb
17

greenhouse gas emissions “are premature and are not justified
by the state of scientific knowledge or the economic risks they
create.”41 This strategy emphasized the undesirable opportunity
costs associated with mitigation or adaptation and highlighted
disparities between States. The GCC predicted increased energy
costs, unemployment, and declining economic growth.42 More
recently it points to the lack of universal participation by States
as limiting the environmental effectiveness of the UNFCCC.43
These strategies were not universally supported by industry.
Indeed, one may speculate whether fragmenting industry opinion prompted the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S.
Council for International Business had urged the U.S. government to consult with it prior to ratification.44 A $13 million
media campaign sought to bolster North American opposition.45
However, the failure of several members of the U.S. Business
Roundtable to secure a more moderate advertising text underscored divisions within industry. Although the U.S. Business
Roundtable subsequently endorsed the U.S. government’s decision not to ratify, the ICC envisaged continuing business participation, particularly by European firms.46 In fact, the ICC was
represented at Kyoto by a one-hundred-member delegation.47
So too will the GCC “continue offering assistance to international policymakers.”48 However, its declining credibility as
the singular voice of industry was marked by the withdrawal of
several prominent members between 1997 and 2000. The
newly-established Business Environmental Leadership Council
of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change became an alternative vehicle for presenting commercial perspectives. It also
permitted a volte-face on the emerging scientific consensus and
enabled its members to reposition themselves as offering constructive solutions to climate change questions. The latter is
consistent with business views that sustainable development
offers commercial opportunities.49
Furthermore, the critical participatory role occupied by corporations in the sustainable development context is sought to be
linked to and replicated within the UNFCCC process. Business
and industry as a “major group” of civil society participates in
deliberations of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable
Development to formulate and implement common policy
approaches.50 The ICC believes that climate change “is inextricably linked to the pursuit of a sustainable future.”51 The World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”)
also acknowledges that “it is prudent for business to play its part
by looking for ways to reduce emissions of those gases.”52
Framing issues in sustainable development terms therefore
broadens the political appeal of its climate change position
statements.53

The Use (and Abuse) of Science
The ozone layer negotiations also indicated that technical
scientific critiques can be a useful procedural tool to facilitate
entry. For example, in 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) identified a discernable human influence upon the global climate.54 Alleging that contributing
authors had excluded elements of dissension or scientific uncertainty, the GCC criticized the lack of transparency as to how
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

comments on IPCC drafts were taken into account.55 Although
the U.S. was among those that defended the IPCC’s integrity,
subsequent changes to the review process opened up the reporting process to corporate actors.
An emphasis on sound science can be employed substantively to demand a high burden of proof before regulatory
measures are adopted. For this reason, elements of the business
community supports the precautionary principle. Orthodox risk
management techniques provide a ready alternative to command
and control regulation56 since scientifically derived standards
limit the potential for political arbitrariness in governmental
decision-making.57 A scientific rather than political basis for
identifying carbon emission stabilization targets could also
more accurately take into account natural sources. The application of the precautionary principle moreover affords reputational assurances of environmentally-sound business practices and
enforcement thereof can eliminate uncompetitive rivals.58
Promoting greater resort to voluntary initiatives is also consistent with anti-regulatory objectives.59
That the procedural agenda-forcing power of expert groups
can counter the substantive decision-making power of COPs is
also observable within the UNFCCC process. The technical
expertise marshaled by industry enables representatives to participate in expert working groups underpinning negotiations,
monitor developments, and ensure that commercial perspectives
are accurately understood. For example, the International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
(“IPIECA”) attends IPCC plenary sessions, participates in
expert workshops, publishes joint reports with the U.N.
Environmental Programme, and organizes intergovernmental
symposia.60 It also recruited corporate officers to meet the
IPCC’s call for a stronger industry presence when preparing
technical reports.61 However, attracting industry interest may
prove more problematic than competency criteria.
The UNFCCC secretariat similarly seeks to draw business
into its work program. Close relationships tend to be formed
with well-established business groups who offer more stable
participation. Corporate experts occupy temporary positions to
share experiences and in turn acquire familiarity with its institutional performance. The secretariat’s effectiveness turns upon
budgetary arrangements and decision-making time-frames.
Lessons could also be learned from the Global Environmental
Facility (“GEF”), which also solicits financial management
expertise from corporate officers.62 The GEF secretariat cooperates with commercial interests with a view to executing projects in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.63 However,
private sector roles have been limited to public procurement or
advisory responsibilities on account of bureaucratic inertia and
information disclosure requirements.64 Furthermore, the firms
recruited to construct operational capacity for newly-privatized
industries are predominantly drawn from North America
and Europe.65

Adaptation and Activism
One corporate strategy common to negotiations concerning
ozone depletion and climate change has been for user and proSPRING 2005

ducer industries to insist that proposed reduction schedules
accommodate adaptation. Phase-out programs should respect
normal product and equipment lifetimes since overly strict
timetables impose costly transition periods before full values
have been realized. However, Du Pont demonstrated the advantages arising from pragmatic engagement as a “first mover” by
breaking ranks with resistant business elements that were experiencing declining negotiating influence at that time. It proposed
voluntarily phasing-out chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”) production
ahead of intergovernmental schedules notwithstanding that
“neither the marketplace nor regulatory policy…has provided
the needed incentives” to justify the necessary investment for
developing substitutes.66
Although by no means committing itself to a comparable
extent, British Petroleum (“BP”) is credited with being the first
oil industry firm to acknowledge the case for adopting precautionary measures notwithstanding scientific uncertainty.
This strategy is properly appreciated in light of government signals that hardened industry opposition. In particular, the U.S.
government abandoned voluntary approaches in favor of legally-binding arrangements, and more importantly, invited private
sector contributions in crafting market-based mechanisms. A
strategy of constructive engagement enhances prestige, secures
consumer recognition for “progressive” environmental leadership, offers opportunities to influence outcomes, and better prepares firms when the inevitable regulation becomes effective.
Both case studies “suggest that international environmental
treaties require the assent of major affected industries” as
preconditions for their effectiveness.67 Differences in the regulatory evolution of these two regimes have been attributed to
clearer scientific evidence and the ready availability of alternatives with respect to ozone depletion. Business transformed
from outright opposition to supporting CFC production controls, since the concentrated nature of industry and accompanying market incentives enabled an orderly transition to substitute
products. The climate change context by contrast is associated
with relatively greater and more widely dispersed economic
impacts where the financial commitments, applicable timeframes, and investment risks deter interest in alternatives.

General versus Specific Politically-Organized
Business Groups
A further distinction is the proliferation of politicallyorganized business groups and their diverse role within climate
change negotiations. The ICC, as the most prominent corporate
actor, fulfils advocacy, facilitative, and corrective functions.
First, it supports the UNFCCC process provided that business is
recognized as part of the solution.68 This includes “the opportunity to contribute to rule making by providing information and
views”69 such as substantive proposals on selected items of
interest.70 The ICC seeks to accurately portray the views of its
member federations to national delegations, which in practice
reflects “mainstream” (albeit predominantly European) industry
opinion. ICC statements are also endorsed by trade associations,
national chambers of commerce and industry, and individual
18

firms. To formulate common business messages the ICC solicits sector contributions across a range of issues and subsequently coordinates their distribution. It also organizes BINGO interventions during high-level ministerial sessions and regularly
conducts side events with the UNFCCC secretariat and the
Expert Group on Technology Transfer. BINGO presentations
are also conducted jointly with one or more governments.
Second, the ICC performs a service function by enabling
firms to undertake more effective interventions during a COP.
BINGO meetings review prior developments, identify likeminded delegations, assess the state of negotiations and highlight forthcoming events. The facilitative function also includes
identifying appropriately qualified representatives to participate
on panel discussions and arranging private meetings between
governments and national industries attending a COP. The ICC
additionally prepares detailed accounts of national positions71
to enable informed lobbying by its members.72
Third, the ICC ensures that national delegations espouse
perspectives consistent with positions assumed in other U.N.
fora and prior national determinations. It moreover signals the
economic viability of proposals from a practical commercial
perspective by reminding governments of probable market
impacts and corrects misinformation within industry.
National or trade-specific industry associations exercise
several functions at a COP on behalf of their non-attending
members. These include recruitment, monitoring political deliberations, advocacy (raising issues for intergovernmental resolution), education (providing scientific or policy advice), research
(identifying best commercial practice), and marketing (promoting voluntary mitigation measures to governments or advertising upcoming trade fairs). National trade associations enjoy
close working arrangements with State delegations such as private briefings during a COP on account of routine national level
engagement. Although they can create “noise” around particular
issues, trade associations are unable to assume commitments
without prior conferral with their membership. National anticompetition law moreover limits the degree of cooperation and
information exchange.
Ad hoc or permanent corporate coalitions represent one or
more economic sectors and promote single or multiple issues.
Sponsoring firms in effect purchase time slots during promotional side-events to showcase voluntary corporate initiatives
for tackling carbon emissions, demonstrating research and
development activity, and highlighting cost reduction measures.
Finally, partnerships and strategic alliances may be established
with ENGOs to pursue their mutual interest in influencing international environmental policy. Deriving the assumed social
legitimacy of ENGOs also demonstrates good corporate citizenship.73 Collaboration may additionally facilitate technological
development: for example, “hydrocarbons have made a remarkable penetration in the domestic refrigeration market, partly
because of their support and promotion by NGOs.”74 The question for present purposes is whether these multiple arrangements
are effective in initiating regulatory change.
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PART TWO: ASSESSING AND CHARACTERIZING
REGULATORY INITIATIVES FROM THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
The “new diplomacy” of intergovernmental environmental
negotiations is reputedly characterized by novel procedures75
and the participation of non-State actors including corporations.76 The comparative analysis of Part One above indicated
that infusing commercial perspectives can facilitate or impede
orderly regime development by extenuating the common or disparate economic interests of States. Do the strategic developments suggest that corporations are attempting to regulate governmental behavior and circumvent the self-evident procedural
constraints? If one accepts commercial contributions, does that
make the climate change regime ultimately self-regulatory or
are politically-organized business groups predominantly located
within industrialized States effectively regulating smaller firms
and/or Southern companies? To what extent does regulatory
adaptation by firms correlate with treaty implementation by
governments? This Part argues that the benevolent or malign
implications of regulatory initiatives emanating from the private
sector depend upon the perceived governmental role in designing environmental policy, which regulatory model is employed,
and how its products are correspondingly characterized.

ASSESSING CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
The initial task is accurately elucidating the degree of commercial influence over the regulatory outcome. “The problem of
causality looms large when trying to isolate the influence of one
set of actors from that of others.”77 Although governments are
encouraged to solicit the maximum possible input from
observers to enrich deliberations, there is no assurance that voluntary contributions will be reflected in the final product.
Academic attention has devoted particular attention to the
ENGO role within climate change negotiations.78 Interestingly,
ENGOs have themselves conceded that governments may be
unresponsive to observer activism.79
An analytical framework for linking participation with the
degree of observer influence has been formulated.80 “Influence”
is defined as the intentional transmission of information by
observers and behavioral alterations in response by governments. The former is evidenced by observer activity (for example, lobbying, agenda setting, submitting written, and oral information), access (participatory terms of attendance or providing
advice), and resources (sources of leverage including knowledge, extent of support, and particular role). Behavioral
alterations by governments are evidenced both procedurally (to
what extent did observers participate?) and substantively (were
observer goals actually attained as evaluated against the final
negotiating outcome?).81
Procedurally speaking, the private sector has contributed to
the climate change debate from the outset. Mr. Maurice Strong,
then-CEO of a Canadian electric utility, was Secretary-General
for the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio during 1992. The preparatory process encouraged equitable
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observer representation from developed and developing countries including a fair balance between those with an environmental focus and those having a sustainable development agenda.82 The ICC formulated an environmental management code
of conduct and the WBCSD was established to promote selfregulation by industry. Observer representatives could be
appointed to national delegations and, in accordance with U.N.
practice, oral interventions were at the discretion of
Chairpersons.83 Over one thousand firms participated with
around forty engaged in a broad range of activity.84 The ICC
responded positively to Agenda 21,85 particularly since it sought
to enhance formal participatory procedures “for the involvement
of [NGOs] at all levels from policy-making and decisionmaking to implementation.”86

Diverse commercial
perspectives overwhelm
intergovernmental
deliberations with
complexity, forestall
regulatory progress, and
render public policy
imperatives irrelevant.
Substantively the corporate impact upon intergovernmental
negotiations cannot be discerned from official documents.
Notwithstanding the sentiment of Agenda 21, COP reports continue to emphasize State-centric decision-making and observer
contributions are only recognized en passant. One roundtable
report, for example, identified the “catalytic role governments
play” and the “importance of the private sector was acknowledged.”87 Similarly, the SBSTA welcomed an exchange of
views with industry during pre-sessional consultations, invited
continued cooperation by industry with the Expert Group on
Technology Transfer, and envisaged industry participation in
sector-specific workshops.88 The SBI additionally foresaw
developing risk transfer mechanisms in conjunction with
insurance firms.89
It is entirely plausible that the commercial influence is
overstated given the existing cacophony of disparate voices.
BINGOs constantly question the effectiveness by which their
messages are communicated to and received by governments.
Firms raise issues for consideration, direct agendas, and cajole
governments but final outcomes may be unpredictable or important decisions deferred. Experienced corporate participants are
uncertain whether deliberate strategies succeed or whether
SPRING 2005

governments were merely receptive at that time. Conversely
BINGOs are wary of assuming commitments that are properly
matters of State responsibility and volunteering information
which may be ignored, filtered, or misused. Governments could
be exploiting their interest and expertise when soliciting information on how observer activities could contribute to intergovernmental processes.90 Consultation can be tokenistic or selective with industry contributions limited to presenting information on technological developments to IPCC workshops or
expert meetings. Nonetheless BINGOs seek to make their contribution meaningful: informal meetings during each COP identify issues around which business opinion has coalesced, share
experiences, and discuss topics of common concern. Although
the prediction that European businesses are more environmentally aware than U.S. firms is not universally apparent, the
climate change scenario “best fits the stereotype of a transatlantic divide.”91

CHARACTERIZING CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
This article proposes that assessing commercial contributions to international regulatory development depends upon
which regulatory model is sought to be applied. Part One above
observed that corporate political practices tend to conform to
local regulatory styles. For example, the relatively pluralist U.S.
political system is perceived to be more amenable to interest
group pressures. However, it need not be any more adversarial
than the European Commission (“E.C.”) system, as illustrated
by the successful lobbying of European firms against a carbon
tax. The orthodox command and control approach suggests that
imposing environmental standards is likely to engender resistance, in which case the regulatory response is avoidance by target groups, and regulatory initiatives by them are characterized
as obstructive.

PROMOTING REGULATORY
OR HARMONIZATION?

COMPETITION

The converse of the adversarial model of regulation – the
regulatory competition model – recognizes that environmental
regulation can spur industrial performance as a source of
comparative advantage.92 Regulatory innovation and targeted
intervention by “pioneer” environmental policymakers can
create lead markets for national firms and profitable export
opportunities.93 Regulation is a driver in the commercial selfinterest since it pushes industry towards technological innovation, encourages the development and commercialization of
alternative products or production processes, and establishes
novel service sectors. The waste disposal industry, for example,
is supported by regulatory measures concerning pollution control.94 Governments deliberately develop local specialities and
incidentally increase economic growth and taxation revenue.
The regulatory competition model transposed to the international context entails greater inter-sectoral competition characterizing intergovernmental bargaining insofar as governments
allocate gains and losses. The pertinent question is “who will be
the winners and losers” in the transition towards a less carbonintensive global economy.95 Economic sectors promote their
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particular production speciality (whether it is fossil fuel,
nuclear, hydropower, wind, or solar energy sources) as preferred
policy solutions. The International Gas Union, for example, promotes natural gas as a readily-available fuel alternative associated with reduced carbon emissions.96 The ICC argues that multilateral decision-making should not cherry-pick “winners and
losers” by conferring legally-embedded competitive advantages
to particular technologies, production processes, or economic
sectors and thereby subverting market forces. Industries moreover compete for favorable treatment by way of subsidies or
exemptions. For example, the U.K. government offers incentive
payments to participating firms in its emissions trading
scheme.97 It is similarly argued that taxpayer-sponsored initiatives in pilot programs and demonstration studies are warranted
so that renewable energy sources become competitive in terms
of cost and reliability with conventional fossil fuels.
National perspectives can accordingly be appreciated in
light of their structural dependence upon particular economic
sectors and principal sources of energy supply. Industry groups
opposed to strict emission controls are naturally aligned with
those States that consume or export fossil fuels. Their regulatory initiatives involve the joint pursuit of mutually-shared
negotiating objectives. Lobbying by industry becomes superfluous since there is solidarity with home or host States.98
Governments reciprocate by recognizing national firms for their
voluntary environmental effort and provide technical assistance
for completing greenhouse gas inventories. Corporations also
contribute to regulatory diffusion by promoting the national regulatory framework with which they are most accustomed. Its
adoption as the agreed international legal framework re-directs
the basis for competition, appropriates market share from
rivals, facilitates capital access, and re-allocates regulatory
adaptation costs.
For example, the Australian government has concluded that
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol “is not in Australia’s national
interest.”99 Although arguments for and against ratification are
evenly balanced, the fossil fuel industry is understandably reluctant to relinquish its global leadership in and dependency upon
producing energy and energy intensive products. The Australian
renewable energy sector unsuccessfully argues that ratification
is necessary “to build the next generation of core industries and
to help traditional industries maintain competitiveness in a global marketplace that is increasingly ascribing sustainability principles to development and trade.”100 That said, the government
is voluntarily committed to meeting its Kyoto target and has initiated a range of greenhouse gas abatement programs.
Australian companies have similarly established emissions
reduction targets to maintain their market position and preserve
trading opportunities, possibly in anticipation of the unsheltered
competition associated with eventual ratification.
That the regulatory competition model may pose undesirable consequences is reflected in the threat of migration by energy-intensive industries to havens offering regulatory relief.101
Companies extract an “unfair” competitive advantage through
lower regulatory compliance costs free from comparable legal
21

constraints. The variable progress of States Party to the Kyoto
Protocol, non-Parties, and Parties voluntarily exceeding their
commitments “call into question whether an international
framework approach based on binding, differentiated, and
absolute emission reduction targets can effectively marshal a
sustained global response to climate change concerns.”102 NonParty status may be one means for governments to attract
inward investment and enable economic growth. However,
commercial activity outside the formal regulatory regime is a
short term solution on account of legal uncertainty, restricted
access to resource markets, and exclusion from trading opportunities. Systematic cost-benefit assessments of the competitive
impacts arising from regulatory policies are desirable for
improving political decision-making. State Parties either downgrade regulatory stringency where legally permissible or
encourage non-Parties to assume binding commitments.
The advantages of a level competitive playing field for
firms underlie the regulatory harmonization model. Universal
participation by States maximizes the geographical scope and
liquidity of markets, simplifies cross-border procedures, and
reduces regulatory compliance costs for all.103 Furthermore,
uniform implementation and enforcement prevent un-innovative rivals from undermining conventional regimes and may
ultimately lead to their demise through elimination or acquisition. Commercial contributions to regulatory development
become cost-effective since they obviate lobbying for identical
results within each national jurisdiction. However, the corporate
interest in regulatory harmonization is not unlimited. In particular, industry espouses the free choice of means principle concerning the mode of implementation: all technological options
should remain open with decisions left to host States in light of
local conditions and in conjunction with business consultation.
Relevant to the regulatory harmonization model is that legal
predictability is frequently emphasized by firms as a precondition to foreign direct investment.104 Regulatory uncertainty is a
barrier to business participation when implementing conventional regimes since firms lack the confidence to engage in longterm investment planning.105 Operational requirements have
lifetimes and cost-recovery considerations extending beyond the
first commitment period. Although the Kyoto Protocol calls for
subsequent commitments by Annex 1 Parties to be considered
during 2005, it does not proscribe their nature, commencement,
and duration or specify obligations for Non-Annex 1 Parties.
Governments understandably do not wish to foreclose policy
options. However, the absence of detailed information unsettles
business since decisions concerning technology, siting, permitting, access, and infrastructure must be made now to secure an
acceptable cost, quality, and availability of future energy supplies.106 The immediacy of answering these investment questions fortuitously coincides with the environmental urgency of
addressing climate change. However, the legitimate interest of
firms to limit commercial risks cannot justify inordinate regulatory predictability just as the governmental responsibility for
economic growth must respect the business function of identifying opportunities and threats.
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The regulatory competition and regulatory harmonization
models both suggest a degree of industry-government collaboration for identifying appropriate economic incentives. The coregulation model formalizes this close cooperation between
government authorities and target industries in regulatory
design. European environmental policy formulation is noteworthy for relatively greater resort to consensus-building, voluntary
industry agreements, and negotiated outcomes.107 The preferences of the European Business Roundtable, for example, are
reciprocally expected to be taken into account by European
governments.108
States and corporations are expected to jointly implement
international environmental law “to the extent they are able.”109
Joint collaboration satisfies legal obligations for governments
and enables firms to secure competitive advantages within international markets.110 The political objective of effective treaty
implementation at the national level thereby converges with the
commercial goal of minimizing operational disruption. The
effectiveness and political acceptability of environmental agreements at the national level depends upon support from the
corporate constituency. By this reasoning industry is entitled to
prior participation in intergovernmental negotiations since
exclusion renders subsequent implementation more difficult
given likely non-compliance.111
Although intergovernmental negotiations arise in the context of pre-existing economic conditions, permitting incremental regulatory adaptation by industry should not dictate the
sequencing of regulatory implementation by governments.
Public policy objectives are achievable through contractual
mechanisms.112 Designing international environmental regulation as a market-enabling regime can be expected to draw corporate support.113 In their joint efforts to construct robust and
credible markets, both governments and firms are engaged in
ongoing processes of organizational self-learning to smooth
transition periods.
For example, governments and firms seek to acquire experience with emissions trading as a novel form of environmental
regulation. Several firms engaged in voluntary experimentation
by developing intra-corporate schemes before formal regulatory
arrangements were instituted.114 The International Emissions
Trading Association (“IETA”) has particularly espoused a bullish approach.115 It has identified points of regulatory uncertainty such as whether emissions reduction units constitute recognizable property rights or whether national courts are able to
provide cost-effective dispute resolution.116 By monitoring
CDM decision-making, IETA can employ regulatory familiarity
to attract potential clients to the traders and brokers it represents.117 Observers attend meetings of the CDM Executive
Board in a nearby listening room and respond to calls for substantive or procedural input.118 IETA also drafted standardized
contracts to streamline commercial negotiations and reduce
transaction costs.119
The result reflected at COPs is that regional, national, or
intra-national emissions trading regimes are promoted by governments in conjunction with industry experts. Attempts to court
SPRING 2005

prospective market entrants involve government-backed
schemes claiming commercial credibility. Industry groups analyze each scheme and call for further refinement, particularly
where participatory conditions confer advantages upon local
firms.120 To increase market size IETA further proposed linking
emissions trading regimes.121
An illuminating contrast is that firms with investment projects qualifying under the Kyoto Protocol (and promoted as such
for public relations purposes) may lack the financial incentive to
formally participate as operational entities. The administrative
bureaucracy of the CDM Executive Board concerning project
eligibility and accredited methodologies has thus far limited private sector participation to speculative activity.122 The CDM
remains under-resourced and its lethargic approval process has
only sanctioned several projects to date. To initiate regulatory
decision-making several firms developed candidate CDM projects with a view to evaluating investment viability and distributed data to governments.123

THE RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE
The co-regulation model poses the prospect of regulatory
capture whereby corporations successfully curtail the regulatory autonomy of governments. From the corporate perspective,
environmental strategies are formulated with an eye to subsequent implementation in terms of production cost, potential
liability, and ease of regulatory compliance.124 To minimize
operational disruption to core businesses, environmental
strategies are tailored to existing competencies, stakeholder
expectations, and corporate cultures. The undesirable alternative
includes management restructuring, unrealized goals given
limited resources, and operational inconsistencies across business divisions. From the intergovernmental perspective,
(over)reliance upon information inputs such as the technical
expertise or management experience of firms increases with the
number and complexity of issues to be addressed at a COP.125
Full disclosure is unrealistic in view of business proprietary
information and competition from State enterprises and other
firms. Since the onus lies upon government to identify novel
information sources, they may prefer to engage with the business community through roundtables and workshops where
other actors (including commercial rivals, smaller firms, and
ENGOs) offer counterbalancing perspectives.
Perfecting regulatory regimes necessitates soliciting
observer contributions on the interpretation and application of
the UNFCCC. For example, the GCC provided its views on the
interaction between dispute settlement mechanisms and compliance procedures. Emphasizing the voluntary nature of governmental participation and employing a strictly textual approach
to treaty interpretation, the GCC identified several issues as “not
ripe for resolution,” promoted greater expert inclusion, and
argued that only States Parties could initiate compliance procedures; “not the secretariat, not by other intergovernmental
organizations and certainly not by NGOs.”126 The compliance
procedures of the Kyoto Protocol by contrast can be triggered
by “competent” observers in respect of an existing case.127 This
extends to submitting factual and technical information where
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questions of implementation are raised.128 Furthermore,
reducing carbon emissions has created demand for compliance
measurement protocols. Reporting standards and verification
techniques were developed by the private sector for prospective
adoption by firms as risk management tools and by governments
as the basis for national regulation.129 Accounting, standardization, and accreditation firms also offer their quality assurance
services to government and industry.
Regulatory capture as a means of maintaining “business as
usual” is well-illustrated with respect to technology transfer.
Those industries which originally caused environmental damage
also possess the technical means for rectification. Developing
States seek access to affordable technology free from dependency upon foreign patent holders and developed States are
unable to compel private sector cooperation. Firms are prepared
to transfer technology on mutually agreed terms provided there
is strong intellectual property protection and respect for contractual arrangements.130 It could be argued that the application
or adaptation of existing technological solutions is sufficient
to mitigate climate change since it is proven in the field, less
risky, and currently available. Its more efficient application
reduces energy consumption and reaps “quick win” emission
reductions, delays obsolescence, and recoups a reasonable
return on investment.
Permitting firms to utilize cost-effective solutions may
amount to implementing what is most technologically convenient. Novel and practical solutions (such as photovoltaics, solar
or hydrogen cells, and wind or tidal turbines) pose more challenging technological innovations and lie further from the core
businesses of the incumbent fossil fuel industry. Furthermore,
large firms possess economies of scale to spread research
and development expenditure and the means for global deployment. Such firms can simply acquire this technology once it
has been demonstrated to be commercially viable by risk-taking
companies.
The resulting governmental role will be to remove regulatory and market barriers to the commercialization of technical
options. Meaningful controls may also be desirable to overcome
the preoccupation of well-entrenched firms with short-term
profits and provide a competitive boost to those second
generation firms inclined to innovate. Does the conclusion that
regulatory initiatives tend to track market developments entirely account for the contemporary inertia within the climate
change regime?

PART THREE: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
European attempts at COP 10 to initiate negotiations on
post-2012 commitments were rebuffed by the U.S. as premature
and encountered resistance from the Group of 77. Governments
merely agreed to organize an intergovernmental seminar to
informally exchange information on measures currently being
undertaken to implement existing commitments and on ways to
further develop climate change initiatives.131 Government
resolve (or its absence) is one stimulus for business perceptions
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of commercial opportunities and investment risks. Flawed
through it may be, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol provides directional certainty that sustainable and renewable energy sources
will receive regulatory support. Such a governmental commitment triggers “top down” changes in corporate strategy insofar
as national operating conditions are affected. Intergovernmental
organizations accordingly call upon governments to transmit the
right market signals to investors.132
Political consensus is reciprocally preconditioned by signals from the business community. COP side events assume
greater significance when political negotiations stagnate and
governments become observers to contemporary business practices. From the “bottom up” intergovernmental negotiations
bridge the pace of operational adaptation by intransigent incumbents and voluntary experimental effort by progressive market
participants. This article offers two further explanatory insights
to the timing of regulatory development. The first is the prospect
that diverse commercial perspectives overwhelm intergovernmental deliberations with complexity, forestall regulatory
progress, and render public policy imperatives irrelevant.
The second is the concomitant challenge of ensuring that
business voices are commensurate with the envisaged implementation role.

THE (IN)COHERENCY OF BUSINESS MESSAGES
It has been asserted that “the companies that stand to lose
the most – at least in the short term – have from the beginning
been the most prominent and influential business voices in the
climate negotiations.”133 These include the fossil fuel industries
(coal and oil) as well as energy intensive sectors such as electricity, automobile manufacturing, cement, glass, chemicals,
paper, aluminum, and steel production. Such sectors undertake
cost-benefit analysis, propose further research and caution
against legal commitments. Regulatory initiatives are discouraged by appealing to the strategic or military importance
of industry, domestic energy requirements, detrimental
employment impacts, lower economic growth, lost business
competitiveness, high investment outlay, and modest environmental impact.
It could be reasoned that (a) fossil fuel industries seek to
forestall regime development, and (b) since their views dominate industry opinion, then (c) commercial contributions to the
climate change negotiations favor regulatory inertia. It is true
that the fossil fuel and energy intensive industries have engaged
with the UNFCCC process since its inception whereas other factions are more recent entrants.134 However, the fossil fuel sector
is unrepresentative of the private sector generally and since
“progressive” oil companies are simply adopting hedging strategies, the significance of their regulatory initiatives should not
be overstated.
To simplify regime design, governments prefer to deal with
organized groups representing mainstream opinion. However, it
can be difficult to identify which interlocutor reflects dominant
business opinion and carries sufficient authority to speak “on
behalf of industry.” Industries expected to benefit over the long
term (nuclear, natural gas, and renewable energy sources) have
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become increasingly active but the balance is yet to tilt in their
favor. These sectors press for stricter timetables and targets
which boost product demand and capture market share. The
electronics, agricultural, and forestry products sectors are less
engaged. One survey concluded that although companies are
adopting governance measures,
measuring greenhouse gas
emissions and discussing climate change at board level, few
are treating the issues raised as
imminent financial and environmental threats.135 Business
attitudes “should therefore be
considered cautiously and in
context.”136
This hypothesis suggests
that the diversity of business
interests prevents this constituency from acting as a cohesive block. Since the business
community is not homogeneous it may be unable to marshal coherent or uniform
recommendations. What firms
espouse individually or collectively, how they behave nationally or internationally, and the
consistency of their public posturing with their private action should be carefully distinguished. Individual businesses vary: some are motivated by
technological advancement and others are concerned with the
security of raw materials or stable product demand.
Transnational firms in particular may be unable to espouse any
particular opinion since different national units will pursue that
political strategy most compatible with their host environment.
Furthermore, operational divisions within a single firm may be
differently affected by climate change, thereby precluding the
formulation of a coherent policy.
That considerable variation exists within sectors is confirmed by studies seeking to account for the different strategies
of oil multinationals. Whereas several companies have accepted
the inevitability of regulation, others continue to challenge the
scientific basis of climate change.137 Their initial reactions were
influenced by distinctive home country institutional contexts
and individual corporate histories.138 With the exception of
Exxon-Mobil, strategic approaches began to converge as the climate change issue matured on account of participation in a common industry and management expectations. Differences in the
timing, pace, and type of shift in their climate change strategies
are explicable by reference to their respective commercial interests, management structures, and national operating contexts.139
Particularly pertinent was location (social demands for environmental protection, regulatory culture, and national environmental policy), internal organizational attributes (institutionalized

memory, degree of decentralization and availability of scientific expertise), and economic position (market assessments, long
range planning, and investment interests).140 Since companyspecific features (risk management technique, environmental
reputation, and capacity for
organizational learning) and
international market factors were
approximately identical for each
firm, their variable response is
attributed to the national context,
including the political institutions at work.141 Industry-specific factors militating against
the generality of these observations include its oligopolistic
nature following consolidation
during the 1990s and technological progress (albeit not always
rewarded) towards renewable
energy sources.
It has also been observed
that BINGO participation is relatively more turbulent than
ENGOs: strategic shifts by key
players create tensions within
the business community and
business associations may
become hamstrung.142 Messages
from politically-organized business groups can also reflect the lowest common denominator
between its progressive and conservative members. Their perspective consequently reflects the views of dominant members:
Korean industry, for example, remains resolutely opposed to the
Kyoto Protocol.143 Consensus decision-making becomes an
opportunity for an intransigent or conservative majority to exert
disproportionate leverage and delay or obstruct regulatory
development.

It can be predicted that
regulatory initiatives
will be forthcoming from
European firms on a
formal basis within the
E.C., whereas the
voluntary commercial
efforts of Australian
and U.S. firms will
indirectly shape
regulatory outcomes.
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Sector-Specific Solutions to Procedural Obstacles
Diverse participation is encouraged at a COP on the
assumption that intergovernmental deliberations will be
enriched and implementation enhanced through the identification of broadly shared aims. The UNFCCC secretariat encourages observer participation by organizations that (a) possess
relevant competence; (b) are broadly representative of sectoral
opinion; and (c) produce an equitable geographical balance.
COPs are predominantly attended by commercial interests from
industrialized States and only rarely from developing ones.
Politically-organized business organizations from the North
counter-argue that they represent companies headquartered,
sited, or having operations in the South who will ultimately
assume a greater implementation burden.144
The coherency of the business voice will dissipate in light
of changing scenarios, organizational attributes, and operational
specialization. However, it may be sufficient that the business
community concurs at a level of generality. Market-supportive
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regulatory frameworks entail freedom to trade, respect for
property rights (including protection from expropriation), fair
competition, and non-discriminatory treatment. For example,
governments were called upon to recognize as valid all carbon
emission credits acquired by companies without imposing selective criteria based upon national origin.145 Commercial decision-making and investment planning is sought to be insulated
from policy and regulatory uncertainty. Regulatory conditions
should be characterized by stability, transparency, information
access, non-arbitrary decision-making, minimal transaction
costs (including taxation), protecting intellectual property
rights, and contractual certainty.146 Common industry perspectives also coalesce around binding legal obligations rather than
weak political commitments, comprehensive disclosure concerning prospective national implementation, and up-front
terms for corporate participation.147
This article proposes that successfully harnessing commercial contributions – and diluting the influence of dominant
industry players – necessitates a sector-specific approach to
public policy engagement.148 Preparatory activities for the
International Conference on Financing for Development notably
drew functional distinctions between private banks, institutional investors, other market institutions, non-financial corporations, and business associations.149 Participating firms were
selected by reference to their commercial interests, likely
investment in developing States, geographical distribution, and
gender perspective.150 This analogy particularly applies to
interconnected industries yet to perceive the risks posed by climate change. For example, although actively courted by
ENGOs, the financial services industry has been unable to counterbalance the influence of energy corporations.151 This is
notwithstanding that global warming will occasion more claims
against insurance and re-insurance firms.152 The financial
sector continues to be unaware of the gravity of the issue, perceives no financial connection, lacks adequate information on
corporate emissions (which in turn hampers integrating climate
concerns into financial assessments), and remains uncertain
about investment opportunities on alternative energy
sources.153 However, governments wish to draw upon the
expertise of the financial services sector to inform the deliberations of intergovernmental workshops.154 Promoting the business case for emissions reductions is therefore important for
countering sector disinterest and raising awareness.

ENSURING THE PROPORTIONALITY OF
COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVES
Business has hitherto preferred political action at national
levels where it is accustomed to well-chartered and predictable
channels of influence.155 Significantly, only well-entrenched
U.S. firms participated in the ozone layer negotiations since
most companies were content to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.156 The private sector moreover favors national regulation “because it is also more familiar with this approach, and
feels it can influence it through negotiation.”157 The susceptibility of governments to local pressures coincides with an interest in retaining national regulatory autonomy. Multinationals
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supposedly fear the emergence of international environmental
regimes.158 Commercial activity within international fora is
therefore directed at either blocking transnational measures or
circumventing applicable national constraints (for example,
where lobbying proves ineffective for reversing undesirable legislation or judicial precedents).
Industry also seeks to maintain effective participation pursuant to standardized procedural rules during intergovernmental
negotiations.159 Corporations support the UNFCCC secretariat’s initiatives by providing resources160 since it is likely to be
more receptive to their global management perspectives than
nationally-oriented governments, a fact which could be usefully
directed towards domestic audiences. Proposals for improving
the UNFCCC process include less structured panel sessions
involving free-form dialogue, audience participation, swifter
document dissemination, improved access to the floor during
plenary sessions, oral interventions during discussions, written
comments on specific agenda items, soliciting observer input
through the secretariat, and enhancing expert contributions.
BINGOs also proposed a Policy Dialogue Forum which contemplated a frank exchange of optimum policy options in a
transparent and depoliticized forum open to all interested actors.
Such proposals are consistent with deepening the engagement between civil society and intergovernmental bodies.161
The UNFCCC secretariat is involved in ongoing efforts to
enhance the effectiveness of observer contributions. It is generally supported in this endeavor by governments who are careful
not to establish precedents and prefer to be guided by their
needs on particular occasions. Governments prohibited
observers from approaching national delegations during plenary
debates and considered excluding observers who promoted perspectives contrary to UNFCCC objectives. Extensive agendas,
proliferating meetings or activities, lack of resources, limited
available time, and fragmenting agenda items are overloading
delegations and making negotiations more difficult to efficiently manage. The growing number of side events is “indicative of
deficiencies in the formal process.”162

Business Consultation, Observer Equality,
and Counterbalancing Perspectives
New Zealand was the first government within the UNFCCC process to express an interest in receiving counsel directly
from business during the mid-1990s. The COP convened a
workshop on the desirability of observer advisory committees.163 Business representatives argued that their participation
was crucial for selecting, developing, and implementing economically-sound policies and highlighted their responsibilities
for economic growth, employment, competitiveness, environmental protection, and social development. They supported a
more structured process for communicating commercial perspectives to ensure that practical technical and economic information could be utilized. Since no current arrangement served
industry or government needs, a convenient, direct, and additional communication channel had to be created. Furthermore, a
single mechanism involving different constituencies was not
feasible or desirable.164 ENGOs agreed that contemporary
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consultative mechanisms for soliciting technical input required
strengthening.165
The SBI subsequently evaluated observer entitlements
within other U.N. bodies with a view to developing procedures
to enhance observer participation within the UNFCCC
process.166 It concluded that the secretariat’s “improvised
responses have tended to generosity; the result is an open house
with a rather flimsy structure.”167 Systematically soliciting
observer perspectives could add a “new dimension” even where
existing practice was merely codified since it was uncertain
whether governments would routinely obtain observer opinions
or whether observers are entitled to be heard.168 Additional
questions included addressing different opinions within constituencies, whether governments should engage with non-State
actors at national levels so that observer interaction with the
UNFCCC reflected international interests, and whether governments should enjoy direct access to the views of individual
firms unfiltered by trade associations or ENGOs.
BINGOs proposed a business consultative mechanism
(“BCM”) distinct from the UNFCCC structure whose framework, activities, and internal processes would be determined by
participating business groups.169 It would enable industry to
volunteer unfiltered information and respond to intergovernmental queries in a timely manner on the full range of climate
change issues.170 Achieving a prior consensus position would
be unnecessary since the full panoply of business opinion
demonstrated the complexity of issues requiring intergovernmental resolution. Furthermore, the BCM would not be a means
of negotiating business commitments that were properly made
at national or regional levels. Observers “cannot and should not”
be negotiating parties since it is for governments to decide what
is environmentally necessary and practically achievable given
credible technical and economic assessments. Finally, business
participants from developing countries should receive administrative support and financial assistance.
ENGOs rejected the proposal since mechanisms for observer input should be open and transparent. The BCM in their view
would provide industry with privileged access, enable unreviewed material to be submitted, and curb the numerical
superiority of other observers. The principle of parity moreover
requires that participatory entitlements granted to one
constituency be extended to all others. As an aside, equality of
observer treatment could be usefully affirmed if not by the
UNFCCC procedural rules then pursuant to a COP decision.
Once complication is that UNFCCC Parties such as Australia
and the U.S. wish to participate as observers under the Kyoto
Protocol. Industry recommendations have a self-interested flavor insofar as the purveyors of particular technology may
possess conflicts of interest. Governments are wary of improper
or disproportionate influences exerted by COP observers. Since
domestic constituencies whose agendas are already being
advocated by their national government have little incentive to
participate, minority interests, or those with protectionist ambitions whose views have previously been rejected may wish to
repeat their exaggerated messages during intergovernmental
negotiations.
SPRING 2005

The SBSTA concluded that existing consultative mechanisms be improved until consensus between the UNFCCC constituencies was achieved.171 Significantly, informal activities
undertaken by observers are left unaffected. Although their
impact is difficult to assess on account of their nature, such
activities tend to favor economically privileged actors. These
include lobbying, organizing side events (hiring Conference
facilities, staff attendance costs, and promotional publicity),
providing exhibits, conducting information sessions and
supporting the UNFCCC secretariat. By embedding their best
commercial practices within regulatory regimes, market leaders
possessing the advantages of establishment have the opportunity to determine economic conditions for the remainder of
industry, eliminate uncompetitive rivals, and facilitate corporate
consolidation.
Observer participation enables timely access to intergovernmental deliberations and suggests the likely direction of
national policies. The non-participation of developing States
from the first commitment period, albeit in recognition that
developed countries have historically contributed the lion’s
share of carbon emissions, has afforded the national corporations of industrialized States a valuable lead time over their
Southern counterparts. Such anticipatory action is not without
limit since formal legal frameworks are ultimately required to
underpin market transactions. Prudence dictates a “wait-andsee” approach before irreversible commercial decisions are
taken according to orthodox business criteria and what governments actually decide. Directors also owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders not to engage in overly-speculative investment
activity.
It is also noteworthy that intergovernmental negotiations
have become an elongated and dynamic process where the distinction between negotiation and implementation is blurred.
International environmental regimes are characterized by venues peripheral to the COP (workshops, pre-sessional consultations, expert panels, seminars, and executive body meetings)
and attended by States, intergovernmental organizations and
observers. Off-site side events (“side-bars”) organized outside
the Conference venue involve industry presentations to invited
government delegates and UNFCCC secretariat officials.
Although these fora facilitate information exchange and
consensus-building, they also shift decision-making further
behind the scenes and render them accessible to only the wellresourced.
Ensuring proportionality to business views may be unattainable insofar as commercial opportunities for influencing
governments extend beyond the fora of COPs to include public
procurement contracting and concluding investment agreements. Government and UNFCCC secretariat officials attend
industry-convened conferences which parallel intergovernmental programs. For example, the Business Council for Sustainable
Energy organized roundtables composed of corporations,
ENGOs, governments, and UNFCCC secretariat officials.172
Finally, observers are engaged in education, training, and public
awareness-raising activities largely free from governmental
oversight.173
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CONCLUSION
The challenge of reducing carbon emissions and facilitating
the eventual transition to renewable energy sources is enveloped
within the distinctive sustainable development paradigm.
Emissions trading is an interim measure for Annex 1 Parties
before joint implementation projects come to fruition and foreign direct investment is sought to be redirected towards developing States through the CDM. This article notes how different
regulatory models offer a useful explanatory value when characterizing commercial contributions and intergovernmental outcomes under the UNFCCC. Hence oppositional postures or
proactive strategies by firms may be symptomatic of the adversarial or collaborative regulatory models. It can be predicted that
regulatory initiatives will be forthcoming from European firms
on a formal basis within the E.C., whereas the voluntary commercial efforts of Australian and U.S. firms will indirectly shape
regulatory outcomes. That these corporate initiatives are having
an impact is vindicated by the IPCC’s conclusion that “significant progress relevant to greenhouse gas emissions reductions
has been made and has been faster than anticipated.”174
Corporate engagement with the UNFCCC process offers
useful procedural lessons for other sustainable development
concerns. Commercial contributions include disseminating
information, gathering information, participating in interactive
roundtable sessions, appointing to national delegations, providing counsel or advice, supporting international secretariats, and
conducting side-events. The proposal to institutionalize a communication channel in parallel to the UNFCCC supports several conclusions. First, the BCM illustrates greater corporate interest in formally engaging with intergovernmental negotiators.
Second, the BCM represents an acknowledgment that the procedural rules of access have a limited effectiveness. Informal
methods may favor the well-resourced, but participants are less

controlled, the process less transparent, and outcomes less predictable. Third, the fact that their attempt to enhance their participatory conditions failed also tends to rebut the presumption
that corporations wield inordinate influence over regulatory outcomes.
The concern expressed by governments and ENGOs that
commercial participants enjoy a disproportionate role during
negotiations is not altogether groundless. An anti-competitive or
unrepresentative flavor to industry participation is justifiable
inasmuch as the principal corporate participants are large multinationals possessing the requisite financial, technical, and organizational resources whereas small and medium-sized enterprises depend upon trade associations. Observer parity encounters
the reality that corporations operate within the industrialized
North, developing countries, and States not Party to the Kyoto
Protocol.
Finally, commentators must be cautiously discerning when
seeking to identify prevailing business opinion. The fossil fuel
industry will remain active in negotiations since the outlook for
energy products remains strong in the short- to medium-term.
Their strategic objective to prevent or favorably shape regulatory development has been inadvertently assisted by an incoherent
business voice. The renewable energy industry, a niche business, will correspondingly occupy a marginal political role, but
one which has been growing since COP 3. Corporate engagement as a strategy for initiating regulatory change is moreover
complicated by the widely-recognized tension between global
integration and local responsiveness. Insofar as intergovernmental negotiations have stalled then progress must emanate
from within industry. The first Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol to be held in Canada in December 2005 may
prove to be that catalyst.
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